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I. Introduction
In thinking about memory development, we have rarely questioned the essential
similarity of the processes studied under the rubrics problem solving skills and
memory strategies (Brown, 1975a, 1977a, 1977b). A general class of information
processing models, with their emphasis on routines which are controlled and
regulated by an executive, seem suitable for describing the major psychological
processes of interest in both domains. However, as our charge at this symposium
was to function under the memory development heading we decided to refocus our
thinking from our usual position of regarding the problem-solving and memory
people as those who study the same processes but on different tasks. Instead,
we began by looking for any interesting differences between the major emphasis
and accomplishments in one field which could intelligently inform the develop-
ment of the other. There do appear to be some psychologically interesting
differences, not only in the tasks and skills studied, but in the depth of
analysis devoted to those tasks and skills and in the commitment to addressing
instructional goals. In the first part of this paper we will highlight some
of these differences between the two approaches and try to illustrate a
weakness in the current mainstream of memory development research. In the
second part we will concentrate on one area of general concern to both the
problem solving and memory development literatures, that of self-regulation
and control, our candidate for the most fundamental difference between the
experienced and the naive. In the final section we will indicate new problem
areas and new ways of considering what it is that develops with age and
experience.*
II. Differences Between the Memory Development and
Problem Solving Approaches to Cognitive Development
As our task is to consider what memory theorists have to say concerning
development, we will approach the issue from the perspective of the memory
development literature. Studies concerned with some aspect of memory dominate
the field of cognitive development at this time, at least in number if not in
content. Before we address the issues central to such research, a brief history
of the way developmental psychologists interested in memory have approached the
question of what develops might prove illustrative.
A. Early Studies
Prior to the 1960s the question, "what develops," would not have been
raised. Obviously, memory develops. Lacking a fine grained analysis of memory
processes, early researchers selected tasks and age groups somewhat randomly.
They found that on most tasks, older children remembered more than younger ones,
and slow learners had more difficulty remembering than those of average ability!
The predominant explanation, when one was offered at all, was that immature
learners have a limited memory "capacity"; and as they mature this capacity
increases, allowing them to retain more. The underlying metaphor, whether
implicitly or explicitly stated, was the mind as a container: little people
have little boxes or jars in their heads, and bigger people have bigger con-
tainers. Any demonstration of inferior performance on the part of the smaller
person proved the capacity limitation "theory", not surprisingly, as such a
theory was merely a restatement of the data (Chi, 1976). The same general
state of affairs also characterized the problem solving literature, where early
studies also illustrated poor performance by young children on a variety of
tasks. Explanations of why the young do poorly were either not forthcoming or
involved a circular argument--little people have little problem solving
capacity, a restatement of the data masquerading as a theoretical explanation.
More sophisticated, or simply more adventurous, theorizers subdivided the
metaphorical containers. They attributed the deficits in memory or problem
solving performance to a limitation in the space available in one of the main
architectural structures of the information processing system, with space defined
in terms of the number of slots, spaces, or buffer units available to the system
at any one time. It was thought that as a child matured, his available space
increased. The correlation of digit span with age, intelligence, and general
problem solving efficiency was taken as firm support for this notion of increasing
space with increasing age, and short-term memory was cited as the most likely
culprit in the young child's mental overpopulation problem. With Chi and Case
as the other speakers in this session, and Simon as a participant in another, we
can leave discussion of the pitfalls of a simple capacity notion to the more
experienced (Chi, 1976). Historically, most developmental psychologists also
avoided the issue of architectural systems and capacity limitations thanks to
two important influences on the field, the pioneering work of John Flavell (1970)
on memory strategies in the young, and the widespread dissemination of levels of
processing approaches to memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) with their de-emphasis
on capacity, coding, and flow in and between containers.
B. The Production Deficiency Hypothesis
The guiding hypothesis of developmental memory research, initiated by
Flavell in the 1960s and still popular today, is that the main difference between
young children and mature memorizers is the tendency to employ a variety of
mnemonic strategies whenever feasible. Borrowing from mediational theories of
learning, Flavell introduced the terminology of production and mediational
deficiencies to describe this difference. A production deficiency is said to
exist when the child does not spontaneously produce a task-suitable mnemonic;
however, if trained to do so, the child can use the mnemonic and his performance
improves as a result. A mediational deficiency exists when a child produces a
necessary mnemonic either spontaneously or under instruction, but it fails to
enhance performance. Probably due to the paucity of strategies selected for
study, mediational deficiencies have rarely been documented, and therefore the
central issue in the memory development research has been the spontaneous pro-
duction of appropriate mediation.
Simply stated, the theory consists of three propositions: (1) young chil-
dren do poorly on a variety of memory tasks, because they fail to introduce the
necessary mnemonic intervention; (2) if they are trained to use a suitable
strategy, their performance improves, at least temporarily; (3) if the memory
task does not demand mnemonic intervention, developmental differences will be
minimal. To prove or disprove one or the other of these hypotheses is still the
goal of the majority of developmental memory studies.
It is also reasonable to characterize the field as remarkably limited in the
tasks selected for examination. When seeking to prove or disprove proposition
1 or 2, investigators almost invariably choose some rote memorization situation,
such as list learning, where rehearsal or taxonomic categorization is the stra-
tegy of choice. When seeking to prove or disprove proposition 3, they select
some sort of recognition memory task. We have objections to both approaches.
We believe that the strategy-no strategy distinction served a valuable function
in its time by organizing a chaotic field and by attempting to distinguish when
and where the limitations of youth, lack of experience, or low IQ would be most
debilitating. However, the two main lines of research now following this
tradition have such severe built-in limitations that future proliferation should
not be encouraged. The main problems center around the study of tasks rather
than processes and the paucity of developmental information provided by the
particular tasks selected.
1. Nonstrategic tasks. The first of these two lines of research currently
generating a spate of studies is one for which we feel personally responsible.
These studies focus on proposition 3, which we were rash enough to make explicit
(Brown, 1973, 1974, 1975a) rather than implicit as Flavell had done (1970). The
proposition asserts that if a situation exists where deliberate mnemonic inter-
vention is not a prerequisite for efficient performance, developmental differences
will be minimized. Obviously, it would be futile to seek tasks where no develop-
mental differences occur; for not only must the tasks selected be impervious to
mnemonics efforts, but they must also be uncontaminated by any other develop-
mentally sensitive factor. The point of the original statement was not to prove
the absence of developmental trends, but merely to demonstrate that the magnitude
of any developmental effect is sensitive to the degree that sophisticated plans
and strategies can interface the subject-task interaction. In general, the
hypothesis is well supported whether the comparison involves intentional versus
incidental learning instructions in adults or cross-age comparisons (Brown &
Smiley, 1977b). Situations do differ in the degree to which intentional mnemonic
action can enhance performance, and some recognition memory and recency tasks are
less sensitive to strategic intervention than are many other memory tasks that
require rote recall (Brown, 1975a).
This does not seem to be the point that the current set of studies seeks
to prove. Interest has shifted from processes to tasks per se, and the game has
become one of trying to show developmental differences in recognition memory tasks.
6In general, such attempts are successful, but their success is not surprising.
Recognition memory as a task is clearly not impervious to developmental dif-
ferences. True, with distinct target and distractor items, excellent levels
of performance have been found for very young children as well as adults, a
ceiling effect which often clouds interpretation of age effects. However, with
careful choice of distractors, one could easily produce a floor effect across
all ages. Matching-to-sample tests have been devised so that choice of the
correct alternative is extremely difficult even without any memory load. Floor
or ceiling effects can completely obscure developmental differences, and it was
for this reason that we selected variants of a recency problem for our earlier
studies of the strategy-no strategy distinction (Brown, 1973a, 1973b, 1973c).
If the question of interest is Whether or not age differences will be found
in a recognition memory task, the distractor items are crucial. Even the simple
manipulation of increasing the number of distractors on a choice trial increases
the likelihood of finding a developmental trend, as young children's performance
is disrupted by this manipulation (Brown, 1975b). If, however, one would like to
show that young children perform better than older children, then a more subtle
manipulation might be needed, but in principle, such a demonstration is possible.
For example, one could vary the similarity of the distractor and target items
along some scale of physical or semantic similarity not yet salient to the young,
but distracting to the old. The less mature child would not be snared by the
"related" distractor and should outperform the confused older participant. If
we knew enough about the development of conceptual systems, we should be able to
produce any possible pattern of age effects in recognition tasks by varying the
target-distractor similarity on dimensions differentially salient to the ages
under investigation.
Such an endeavor, however useful for testing hypotheses concerning conceptual
development, is not relevant to the original discussion of whether some situations
exist where young children perform well on memory tasks. The importance of under-
standing that the magnitude of developmental differences varies as a function of
task demands should not be lost in this argument. The dramatic differences
between even college students trained in some exotic mnemonic and those not so
trained is enormous (Bower, 1970; Crovitz, 1970), and the problem faced by the
young child who fails to introduce even simple aids must be seen in this light.
We would still defend the position that in order to understand what memory
development is, it is essential to identify areas of strength as well as areas
of weakness (Brown, 1974, 1975a). Furthermore, if we wish to devise remedial
help for the inexperienced we need both to capitalize on naturally-occurring
stren"ths ' and to identify major areas of deficiencies. Finally, as Chi (1976)
has argued persuasively, it is only by eliminating candidates for what does not
develop that we can identify the true areas of developmental deficiencies.
2. The modal memory strategy experiment. The second line of research
currently dominating the field is a proliferation of replication studies demon-
strating the developmental sensitivity of strategy susceptible tasks. One
problem with these studies is overkill--they long ago provided ample documen-
tation of young children's mnemonic ineptitude. Further, they have been designed
in such a way that they provide a surprising dearth of information concerning
memory development, even if by that we restrict ourselves to the emergence of
common mnemonic strategies.
The main problems again stem from undue concentration on a limited subset
of tasks and strategies. Almost all studies concerned with the mnemonic pro-
duction deficiency hypothesis have centered on list learning tasks and the
8strategies of taxonomic categorization and rehearsal. Apart from the obvious
undesirability of any restricted focus if we wish to gain an overview of develop-
mental processes, and the now oft-lamented lack of ecological validity of such
tasks (Brown, 1977b), there are some interesting limitations imposed by this
particular focus. First, these two strategies tend to emerge between the ages
of five and seven years and, under the conditions usually studied, do not undergo
much refinement after the grade school years. Thus, we are left with an almost
total lack of information concerning what develops before five and after eight
or nine years of age. The second problem is that we lack detailed models of the
gradual emergence of even these simple strategies, and indeed they may not be
susceptible to detailed task analyses.
The typical experiment in this area consists of crude assessments of the
presence or absence of strategic intervention. Children are then divided into
those who produce and those who do not; those who produce outperform those who
do not. We rarely have evidence of intermediate stages of production. Conse-
quently, we are usually unable to describe the developmental progression of the
skill or to diagnose the current state of the learner so that instructional
programs can be tailored to fit individual needs.
Probably the most important deficiency is that the tasks are set up in such
a way that we cannot say anything about nonproducers. If children are not
rehearsing on our task, we have no way of knowing what it is that they are doing.
From the standard production deficiency experiment we receive no information
concerning the younger or less efficient child, and it is often this information
that we really need. This criticism is true of other areas of cognitive develop-
ment, which also reflect the pervasive influence of the production deficiency
paradigm in developmental research. Imprinted early on the five to seven age
period as one of important cognitive change (White, 1965), developmental
psychologists as diverse as those with behavioristic (Kendler & Kendler, 1962)
or Piagetian (Kuhn, 1974) leanings have followed a modal experimental design
with the following characteristics. The age range of the children studied is
usually kindergarten to fourth grade, although occasionally four-year-olds and
fifth graders are included. Typically no more than two or three ages are studied,
and age, not pretest competency, is the developmental variable. Performance on
one standard task is assessed. The main metric is presence or absence of a
strategy or rule; and the inevitable finding is that younger children do not have
it, older children do, and occasionally there is an intermediate stage. The
inclusion of the youngest group ensures that a reliable developmental trend can
be reported, as they usually perform abysmally. Even a cursory review of develop-
mental journals will show an amazingly large number of studies meeting these
criteria of the modal production deficiency experiment.
Apart from providing a baseline from which improvement with age can be
measured, the inclusion of the younger or less efficient group in these enter-
prises provides little information. They perform poorly, and therefore high-
light the improvement with age we wish to demonstrate. But we know nothing
about their state of understanding. They are characterized as not being at a
certain level, of not having a certain attribute; they are nonproducers,
nonconservers, nonmediators; they are not strategic or not planful; they lack
number concepts, reversible operations, or transitivity. They are sometimes
described as passive, even though the tasks are designed so that the only way
to be characterized as active is to produce the desired strategy. All of these
descriptions are based on what young children do not do compared with older
children, rather than what they can do; for we have no way of observing this in
the confines of the tasks selected for study.
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In the memory development area, the dominance of the modal experimental
design aimed at list-learning strategies has led to two veritable wastelands in
our knowledge: we know next to nothing concerning memory development in the
preschool period and even less about how the process evolves during the adoles-
cent years. The major forays into these territories have been the attempts of
clever investigators to push down the age at which production of common strategies
occurs (Wellman, 1977). There have been very few attempts to look at the emer-
gence of more ingenious strategies in the high school population (Brown & Smiley,
1977b).
This description of the modal production deficiency experiment is overly
harsh, but it is intended to indict the pedestrian nature of most of the current
literature rather than the creativity of the original investigations in the area.
And we should not ignore a major strength of this research area; the sheer bulk
of data does provide impressive support for the generality of the strategic
deficit hypothesis. But there are also the attendant weaknesses we have mentioned:
(1) an undue concentration on a few standard tasks of limited ecological validity;
(2) the lack of precise developmental models of emergent skills; (3) the concen-
tration on a very narrow age range; and (4) the lack of information concerning
nonproducers.
C. Task Analyses
Many of the major investigators in the problem-solving area share a common
approach, that of providing detailed task analyses of the processes they study.
They also share a common location, Carnegie-Mellon and Pittsburgh, so, not sur-
prisingly, their approach is well represented at this symposium. Therefore, we
will concentrate on just a few main facets of this work, which contrasts sharply
with the modal production deficiency experiment of developmental memory research.
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The main emphasis is on providing detailed explicit models of cognitive
development within a limited task domain. The aim is to provide precise
descriptions of the initial and final form of the cognitive process under
investigation and to delineate important intermediate stages. The area is
characterized by Klahr and Wallace's (1970) principle of developmental tracta-
bility, i.e., the charge that developmental models should "allow us to state
both early and later forms of competence and provide an easy interpretation of
each model as both a precursor and successor of other models in a developmental
sequence" (Klahr & Siegler, in press, p. ). With a well-designed task analysis,
it should be possible to detect not only the presence or absence of a desired
piece of knowledge or skill, but starting and intermediate stages as well. One
important feature of the typical experimental design in this area is that the
problems selected are sensitive to the gradual emergence of the knowledge studied.
Errors produced by the novice are as informative as correct responses produced by
the proficient, thus providing as rich a picture of the 'non-producer's" strategy
as of the producer's end state rules.
One of our main criticisms of developmental memory research is that such
detailed task analyses have rarely been performed. Notable exceptions are the
work of Ornstein and Naus (1977) and Butterfield and Belmont (1977) on the
emergence of sophisticated rehearsal strategies. Ornstein and Naus have shown
an interesting developmental progression from no production, to an intermediary
stage of repeating single items, to an efficient strategy of cumulative rehearsal.
The cumulative rehearsal stage is also subject to gradual refinement as the size
and stability of the chunks selected become more uniform. Butterfield, Wambold,
and Belmont (1973) have shown that adequate encoding, retrieval, and a coordination
of both are necessary for efficient performance on their circular recall task.
Immature memorizers perform inadequately due to a failure of any one or all of
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these activities. Such attention to intermediate stages of competence is rare.
Although interesting production inefficiencies were documented in the early
Minnesota studies (Corsini, Pick & Flavell, 1966), in general, memory tasks
have not been designed so that systematic stages in an emergent strategy could
be detected.
In contrast to the memory research, consider two experimental programs from
the problem-solving literature--Gelman's (this volume) analysis of the emergence
of counting principles in very young children, and Siegler's (1976, and this
volume) detailed developmental description of children's strategies for solving
the balance scale problem. As these programs are also represented at the con-
ference, we will not give a detailed description here. Note, however, that both
programs do share two important features that are not commonly found in studies
of memory strategy development. First, the knowledge under investigation emerges
gradually with several readily identifiable substages. This is particularly true
of Siegler's work, for the balance task has provided interesting information con-
cerning the levels of competence of children from five to seventeen years. Gelman's
impressive success at uncovering the richness, rather than the poverty, of numerical
reasoning in preschool children has attenuated the age range over which the skills
she investigates develops. Second, both programs provide detailed specification
of feasible rules for solution, and the tasks are engineered so that the particular
rule used (or not used) by the child can be detected. Thus, both programs provide
information which is optimal for those who would attempt instructional intervention.
Systematic error patterns can be used to diagnose the child's pretraining com-
petencies and areas of weakness, so that instructional routines can be tailored to
fit the diagnosis.
To illustrate, we will use the balance scale problem because of the detailed
description of stages and because the instructional relevance of the task analysis
has already been demonstrated (Klahr & Siegler, in press; Siegler, 1976). The
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apparatus is a balance scale with four equidistant pegs on each side of a fulcrum.
Small circular discs, all of equal weight, can be placed on the pegs in various
configurations. The arm of the balance can tip left or right or remain level,
depending on how the weights are arranged. The arm is prevented from tilting,
however, until the child predicts which side (if either) will go down. Siegler
identified four systematic rules that children can employ to solve this task,
rules which fall into a nice hierarchy of increasing maturity. A child using
rule 1 attends only to weight, the number of circular discs on each side of the
fulcrum. If they are the same, the child predicts balance; otherwise he predicts
that the side with the greater weight will go down. A child following rule 2 is
more advanced, for he considers both distance from the fulcrum and amount of weight
whenever the weight (number of discs) on the two sides is equal. When they are
unequal, weight alone dominates. Children using rule 3 always consider both
weight and distance, but when the cues conflict they lack a rule for conflict
resolutions and must guess. Rule 4 represents "mature" knowledge or the "end
state," and solution is based on the sum-of-products calculation. While some
five-year-olds can operate systematically with rule 1, some 16-year-olds still
have problems with rule 4, a nice developmental spectrum for description.
Siegler's task analysis is successful because he can detect not only when
mature knowledge of the torque principle is reached, but also significant mile-
stones along the route. Similarly, by considering the errors produced by two- to
four-year-olds in a counting task, Gelman can diagnose which counting principle
the child lacks--that of one-to-one correspondence, stable ordering, cardinality,
etc. In both cases the key word is diagnosis, not only of end state activity,
but of starting and intermediate levels as well.
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D. Instructional Relevance and Training StudJtee
Training studies have become a characteristic feature of both the memory
developrment and problem solving literatures, although such endeavors are initiated
for different reasonso Training studies in the memory development literature are
by-products of the production deficiency modal experiment and are usually designed
to answer a question of theoretical rather than practical interest. Having demon-
strated that, on their own volition, young children do not use a particular
strategy effectively, the researcher moves on to the next step in the modal
experiment--determining wethther the deficiency is one of production or mediation.
Training is instigated. If performance now improves, the original problem is
deemed one of production; if not, a deficit in mediation is inferred. These
studies are, in general, successful in providing answers to the original ques-
tion of whether production or mediation deficits underlie poor performance. That
the matter rests here, and the modal experiment is judged complete, is justi-
fiable given the original reason for conducting the experiment.
Since instructional relevance was not a guiding concern of the area, the
proponents can scarcely be blamed for falling short of some criteria of accoun-
tability. The outcomes of such studies, however, have little practical utility.
The fact that five-year-olds can be trained to rote rehearse like seven-year-olds
may answer a theoretical question, but is of questionable practical significance.
Indeed, it is interesting that the only programs in the area of memory develop-
ment where practical application has been a major issue are those aimed at
inducing strategic behavior in aberrant populations (Brown, 1974; Brown & Campione,
1977b; Butterfield & Belmont, 1977; Campione & Brown, 1977)o The question of
practical outcomes of training is -of critical concern -when the subject- .*populatrton
is educi-.tionally delayed°
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One must doubt the practical utility of training memory strategies because,
at best, the result is durable improvement on the training task itself, but there
is little evidence for general improvement in performance on similar tasks
(Brown, 1974, 1977b). To borrow from Greeno (1976), we can satisfy behavioral
objectives in that the subjects do perform the trained behaviors, but we cer-
tainly have not satisfied cognitive objectives of changing the subject's under-
lying cognitive processes or the way he views memory problems in the future.
Without evidence of transfer, of a genuine improvement in the subject's under-
standing of the processes involved, one must ask whether improvement on the
training task itself is a desirable end product. As the majority of memory
training studies have focused on inculcating specialized skills of rote learning
lists, the instructional relevance of these outcomes is questionable.
Given the undoubted cost of the detailed task analyses needed before informed
instruction can be initiated (Brown, 1977b; Butterfield & Belmont, 1977; Klahr
& Siegler, in press), it seems reasonable to suggest that instructional relevance
be the guiding force in the initial choice of training tasks (Resnick, 1976). We
should consider tasks where improvement would be a desirable outcome even without
generalization from the training situation. For example, severely retarded
institutionalized people can be trained to perform complex industrial assembly
jobs if the seemingly complex tasks are broken into easily manageable subunits
(Gold, 1972; Wade & Gold, 1977). The goal of the training procedure is to achieve
quick errorless performance on the training task itself, because armed with this
skill the hitherto unemployable individual can earn a living wage. Generalization
of the training is not a prerequisite for a substantial practical improvement in
the trainee's situation. Most training attempts in the problem-solving literature
have focused on elementary arithmetic, counting, reading subprocesses, scientific
reasoning, etc. The major investigators in this area have taken the instructional
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relevance principle seriously, while this has not been a main purpose of memory
training studies.
A second feature of memory training studies is that the training itself is
somewhat cursory. Some of the better procedures consist of the experimenter
modelling briefly what he determines (intuitively) to be the desired strategy.
Some of the worst procedures consist of the experimenter restructuring the to-be-
remembered material (e.g., by blocking categories), presumably in the hope that
the trainee will derive the implicit strategy for himself. The superiority of
explicit intervention has been amply documented (Brown & Campione, 1977a, 1977b;
Butterfield & Belmont, 1977; Campione & Brown, 1977). However, even the better
attempts at explicit instruction are not based on sophisticated task analysis
and do not take into consideration the particular needs of the trainee. The one
notable exception to this rule is the program of Butterfield and Belmont (1977).
In contrast, detailed task analysis is a characteristic feature of training
studies in the problem solving area, and the benefits of this approach for
tailoring individual instruction can be illustrated by again considering the
balance scale problem. Having established the psychological reality of the four-
rule hierarchy, Siegler (1976) proceeded to provide training relative to the
starting level of the trainee. Groups of five- and eight-year-old children who
were operating with rule 1 were presented with two types of training, distance
problems and conflict problems. Distance problems provide the child with experi-
ence with rule 2, while conflict problems provide experience necessary for rule 3.
Thus, training with distance problems was geared one level above the child's
original starting point, and conflict training was aimed at two (or more) steps
ahead.
The stage was set to test a widespread assumption concerning training, that
the distance between the child's existing knowledge and new information is a
17
critical determinant of how successful that training will be (Brown, 1975a, 1978;
Inhelder, Sinclair & Bovet, 1974; Kuhn, 1974; Piaget, 1971). This was confirmed,
as both age groups benefitted from training only one level beyond their initial
competence. When training was geared two levels beyond pretest levels, only the
older children showed improvement. In subsequent studies it was determined that
the five-year-olds' difficulty was one of encoding; they failed to encode distance
information, concentrating their attention solely on weight. After training in
encoding distance, they too could receive some benefit from the conflict problems.
As expected, near training was found to be more effective, although training aimed
two levels above pretest competency provided some help. Presumably, training on
rule 4 would not improve the lot of rule 1 subjects. Of main interest here is
that detailed task analyses informed intelligent instruction. As a result of his
task decomposition, Siegler was able to determine the initial level of the trainee
and what would constitute near or far training for him. Training could therefore
be aimed at the child's present level, and entering ability was the determinant
of what type of training was needed, rather than age or pretest failure as is the
case in memory studies.
In this section we have emphasized differences in the current approaches
taken in the mainstream of the memory development and problem solving areas.
These differences are most apparent when one considers task analyses and instruc-
tional relevance. Note, however, that although there is a clear difference in
emphasis, both literatures have followed a similar evolution. Both have pro-
gressed from a concentration on demonstration studies, through a period of pro-
duction deficiency examinations, to a concern with training (Kuhn, 1974). By
emphasizing recent advances in the problem-solving literature, we hoped to
illustrate a weakness in the current state of the art concerning memory develop-
ment.
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III. Commonalities Between Memory Development and Problem-Solving Literature
In the previous sections we have emphasized divergence between investigators
in the mainstream of memory development research and those classified as cognitive
psychologists interested in problem solving. Here we will emphasize an area of
convergence, for investigators in both areas are becoming increasingly concerned
with the child's knowledge about the rules, strategies, or goals needed for
efficient performance. Klahr (1974) distinguished between knowledge and the
understanding of that knowledge. For memory theorists the division is between
memory skills and capacities, c"metamemory, the knowledge one has concerning
them (Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Most theories of human cognition and artificial
intelligence also make a distinction between the knowledge and routines available
to the system and the executive that monitors and controls the use of these data.
Although we appreciate that there are serious problems with this simple dichotomy
(Brown, 1977a, 1977b; Klahr, 1974; Winograd, 1975; Woods, 1977), in the interest
of brevity we will accept the division here and ignore the theoretical complica-
tions. Also in the interest of brevity, we will not review the literature con-
cerning metacognitive development, as there are now available several reviews of
the gradual emergence of self-interrogation and regulation over a wide range of
situations (Brown, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c; Flavell, 1976; Flavell & Wellman, 1977).
A. Self-Interrogation and Self-Regulation
The main premise we would like to discuss is that when faced with a new type
of problem, anyone is a novice to a certain extent. Novices often fail to perform
efficiently not only because they may lack certain skills but because they are
deficient in terms of self-conscious participation and intelligent self-regulation
of their actions. The novice tends not to know much about either his capabilities
on a new task or the techniques necessary to perform efficiently; he may even have
difficulty determining what goals are desirable, let alone what steps are required
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to get there. Note that this innocence is not necessarily age related (Chi, this
volume), but is more a function of inexperience in a new problem situation.
Adults and children display similar confusion when confronted with a new problem:
a novice chess player (Chi, 1977) has many of the same problems of metacognition
that the very small card player experiences (Markman, 1977). For both, the
situation is relatively new and difficult. Barring significant transfer from
prior experience, the beginner in any problem-solving situation has not developed
the necessary knowledge about how and what to think under the new circumstances.
The point we wish to emphasize is that children find themselves so situated
more often than adults, and very young children may be neophytes in almost all
problem situations. Thus an explanation of why young children have such generalized
metacognitive deficits (Brown, 1977b; Flavell & Wellman, 1977) is that most of
our experimental tasks are both new and difficult for them. It is this lack of
familiarity with the game at hand that leads to a concomitant lack of self-
interrogation concerning the current state of knowledge and to inadequate selec-
tion and monitoring of necessary steps to decrease the distance between starting
levels and desired goals. The child's initial "passivity" in many memory and
problem solving tasks, his failure to check and monitor his ongoing activities,
his failure to make his own task analysis, could be the direct result of gross
inexperience on such tasks. This does not mean that young children are incapable
of self-regulation, only that they tend not to bring such procedures to bear
immediately on new problems. Children are universal novices, it takes experience
before they build up the knowledge and confidence which would enable them to adopt
routinely the self-interrogation mode of the expert (Bransford, Nitsch & Franks,
1977).
Although absolute novices tend not to incorporate effective metacognitive
activities into their initial attempts to solve problems, it is not simply the case
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that experts do and novices do not engage in effective-- .el.f-regulation. As
Simon and Simon (this volume) have pointed out in their study of physics
problem solvers, the expert engaged in less observable self-questioning than
did the relative novice, for the processes of problem solving in this domain
had become relatively automatized for the expert. The relative novice, however,
provided many instances of overt self-questioning and checking. Note that Simon
and Simon's novice had received sufficient background instruction so that the
basic rules for solution were knoWn to her. We would characterize her state of
knowing as typical of the learner, acquainted with the rules of the game and
beginning to acquire expertise.
We would not be surprised to find that there is a relatively typical pattern
of activity characterizing the process of becoming an expert. First, the
absolute novices would show little or no intelligent self-regulation due to
complete unfamiliarity with the task. This would be followed by an increasingly
active period of deliberate self-regulation as the problem solver becomes
familiar with the necessary rules and subprocesses, and attempts to orchestrate
these activities which are deliberate and demand effort. Finally, the performance
of the expert would run off smoothly as the necessary subprocesses and their
coordination have all been overlearned to the point where they can be coordinated
relatively automatically.
We have as yet little developmental data to suggest that such a pattern is
a characteristic feature of growth during problem solving, but we would like to
predict that such a progression would be a relatively stable feature of learning
in many domains. Furthermore, although age and experience are obviously intimately
related, we do not believe that the growth pattern is necessarily age related.
Young children may show the same progression of naivety to competence within
simpler task domains. Evidence such as that provided by Chi'i (this volume)
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young chess experts is exactly the kind needed to support this conjecture. If
we wish to understand how much of the young child's ineptitude is due to lack of
expertise, rather than age per se, we must look at behavior in areas where the
child is competent as well as those where he is inefficient.
There is one other factor that might contribute to the young child's general
metacognitive problem. In addition to being hampered by the novelty of most
experimental situations, young children may simply not realize that there are
certain metacognitive operations which will be useful in practically any situation.
These general metacognitive skills are discussed at length in another paper
(Brown, 1977b), and we will only briefly summarize them here. The basic skills
of metacognition which the child must acquire include predicting the consequences
of an action or event, checking the results of one's own actions (did it work),
monitoring one's ongoing activity (how am I doing), reality testing (does this
make sense), and a variety of other behaviors for coordinating and controlling
deliberate attempts to learn and solve problems. These skills are the basic
characteristics of efficient thought, and one of their most important properties
is that they are transsituational. They apply to the whole range of problem-
solving activities, from artificially structured experimental settings to what
we psychologists defensively refer to as "real world, everyday life" situations.
It is equally important to check the results of an operation against some cri-
terion of acceptability, whether one is memorizing a prose passage or reading a
textbook, following instructions in a laboratory experiment, a classroom, or on
the street, A child has to learn these various skills, but perhaps of equal
importance, he has to learn that they are almost universally applicable, that
whenever he is faced with a new task, it will be to his advantage to attempt to
apply his general knowledge about how to learn and solve problems.
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Not only does interest in metacognition characterize both the problem-
solving and memory development literatures of American developmental psychology,
but traditionally this has been a prime concern of Soviet studies of cognitive
development. Vygotsky (1962) was one of the first to describe the two phases in
the development of knowledge: first its automatic unconscious acquisition,
followed by a gradual increase in active, conscious control over that knowledge.
Recent translations of previously unknown work of Vygotsky's attests to his life-
long interest in what we now call metacognition (Wertsch, personal communication).
The ingenious studies of Istomina in tracing the goal-directed, conscious control
of early memory strategies (Istomina, 1975) and later study skills (Smirnov,
Istomina, Mal'tseva and Samokhvalova, 1971) are notable exceptions to the
wastelands discussed above. Thus, there is considerable agreement among
American and Soviet psychologists that what develops in a variety of problem-
solving situations is the increasing conscious control and regulation of goal-
oriented strategies.
B. Invention and Generalization
Given their common interests in training strategies or rules and in meta-
cognitive development, it is not surprising that in both the problem-solving and
memory development fields, there is a growing interest in whether metacognitive
development can be fostered or accelerated by direct intervention. The position
has been nicely stated by Norman, Gentner and Stevens.
The skills of debugging are clearly important ones. Papert
believes it is perhaps even more important to teach a child how to
debug his own knowledge than to teach him the knowledge itself.
The implication is that if a child knows how to learn, then he can
get the knowledge by himself. We find that this philosophy strikes
a sympathetic chord: Why do we not attempt to teach some basic
cognitive skills such as how to organize one's knowledge, how to
learn, how to solve problems, how to correct errors in understanding.
These strike us as basic components which ought to be taught along
with the content matter (Norman et al., 1976, p. 194).
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The same philosophy has been stated recently in both the memory training
and problem-solving literatures (Brown, 1977b), and of course it is the essence
of the distinction between cognitive and behavioral objectives of training
(Greeno, 1976). The central question is how do we foster the development of
generalized knowledge concerning one's own cognitive actions and, to go even
further, how do we induce invention of new and more efficient skills for problem
solution? Facile generalization and invention are traditional signs of intelli-
gent activity and are prime candidates for "what develops". Young and slow-
learning children are not efficient at: (1) going beyond the information given,
(2) inventing new solutions, or (3) transporting old solutions across task
boundaries. These problems distinguish their behavior over a wide variety of
tasks.
The question of whether direct intervention can bring about improvement in
metacognitive functions is only just beginning to be the subject of intensive
research activity. It is easy to suggest that training should be aimed at showing
children "how to organize their knowledge," "how to learn," and "how to solve
problems"; but it is considerably more difficult to instantiate these suggestions
in concrete training programs. Some advances have been made, however. Resnick
has had some success in the area of elementary mathematical reasoning in instructing
"routines that put the learner in a good position to discover or invent strategies
for themselves" (Resnick, 1976, p. 72). Similarly, our initial attempts at
inculcating simple checking and monitoring strategies have been quite successful
and, indeed, represent our only evidence of generalization in educable retarded
children (Brown & Campione, 1977b). For example, children trained to estimate
their recall readiness prior to a test of ordered rote recall of a list of
picture names, became more efficient and maintained their efficiency for at least
a year. Furthermore, the effects of training generalized to a somewhat different
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task where the children were required to indicate their readiness to reproduce
the gist of simple stories. Training children to stop, check, and self-question
before responding does seem to be effective.
As a further illustration of the convergence of the problem-solving and
memory development fields, both Resnick (Resnick & Beck, 1977) and Brown (1977c)
have independently extended the notion of self-regulation as a general charac-
teristic of successful learning to the problem of reading comprehension. Both
suggest that instruction in conscious use of self-interrogation and self-
monitoring strategies might prove effective in enhancing comprehension skills
of poor readers.
These preliminary successes with training self-monitoring in children are
most encouraging. Equally encouraging for the prognosis of successful training
of metacognitive insights is the outcome of an intensive course in problem-
solving skills provided for college students (Hayes, 1976). Self-reports at the
end of the semester-long training program indicated that the main areas of
improvement were ones we would term metacognitive. The students reported
increased awareness of their own cognitive processes, improvement in planning
and organizing, increased diagnostic skills (or personal task analyses), and
improvement in generalized problem-solving skills. Attempts to develop intensive
training programs aimed at young and slow-learning children are currently under-
way in our laboratory (Brown, 1977b).
As we have seen, it is primarily in the area of metacognitive development
that the areas of problem solving and memory development converge. It is also
here that current interest and activity is being generated, and we are optimistic
that from such approaches we will gain considerable insight into "what develops"
in normal children and what can be induced in the less proficient.
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C. Strengths and Weakness of Both Approaches
The two major bodies of knowledge concerning cognitive development, the
problem-solving and memory development literatures, have been compared and con-
trasted. We have emphasized the major differences in approach and indicated that
the one topic of current concern in both areas is that of metacognition. This
merging of interest from two distinct fields of inquiry is exciting, and it is
because of this convergence that we select the metacognitive skills of self-
interrogation and self-regulation as prime candidates for what develops.
In contrasting the differences rather than the similarities of evolution in
the two research areas, we have also highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of
each approach, for the strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other. The large
body of literature in the memory development area has provided us with impressive
evidence of the generality of the strategy deficit problem in young children's
thinkting. There are literally hundreds of examples of the young child's failure
to employ common mnemonics on laboratory rote-learning tasks.
We know a considerable amount about how the child comes to employ deliberate
skills of remembering, first in the realm of real-world activities (Istomina,
1975), and then as a deliberate goal of laboratory tasks. We also know a con-
siderable amount about what does not develop (Brown, 1975; Chi, 1976). We can
predict fairly accurately not only that the young will perform poorly on memory
tasks, but where or when their difficulties will be most apparent. We also are
beginning to make progress in identifying the underlying processes responsible
for inadequate performance (Chi, 1976; Huttenlocher & Burke, 1976). These are
real and important advances. Researchers in the problem-solving areas, because
of the need for expensive, detailed task analyses, do not have a similar mass of
data to support their conclusion. Their concentration on a very limited set of
problems with fortunate properties of easy discomposition into steps is inevitable.
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The major weaknesses in the memory development literature are the strengths
of the problem-solving area. Whereas the memory studies can be characterized
by a general lack of detailed explicit models of varying states of competence,
the problem-solving literature, has several good examples of detailed models.
Similarly, a concern for instructional relevance is a notable feature of the
problem-solving area, but memory-training studies have not been designed to answer
questions of instructional relevance.
What is needed at this point is a merging of the two disciplines, a convergence
which can most readily be achieved by considering new tasks and processes where
a dichotomization between strictly memory versus problem-solving tasks would not
be made. In the next section we will introduce some of our favorite candidates.
IV. Alternate Methods for Asking What Develops
In order to answer the pertinent question concerning cognitive development,
what develops, it may be necessary for us to expand the repertoire of tasks and
strategies we select for intensive examination. If such an expansion is warranted,
it might be wise, before embarking, to consider critically the criteria by which
we select new tasks. Ideally, we would like to harness the strengths of both the
traditional memory and problem-solving literatures. In this section we will
(a) indulge in speculation concerning ideal criteria for task selection, (b)
introduce a subset of tasks where we have some initial data and which we believe
tap important psychological processes, and (c) suggest alternate methods of
observing cognitive growth.
A. Criteria for Selecting Tasks and Strategies
Extrapolating from the previous sections, we believe that an ideal strategy
to study would be one that is within the repertoire of the child across a wide
age range and one that can fairly be said to represent an important cognitive
activity. Furthermore, starting, intermediate, and ending states should all be
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traceable. Ideally, the process under examination should be susceptible to
description by means of detailed, explicit models which can map its developmental
progression. The type of activity we have been looking for, therefore, are those
that show interesting early precursors and are activities engaged in during problem
solving by both young and old.
In addition to a broad age range where the processes of interest are undergoing
change, a broad task range should also be a selection criterion. By this we mean
that the process under investigation should be a useful activity across a wide
variety of tasks. If we are to invest considerable effort in mapping a develop-
mental progression in some cognitive domain, we should focus on a cognitive process
of widespread generality. And, in the same vein, if we are prepared to embark on
training attempts, whether for basic or applied raasons, the process we wish to
inculcate should have reasonable instructional relevance. Furthermore, training
preferably should result in cognitive gains as well as behavioral gains (Greeno,
1976).
Finally, we should select a task where we can consider not only the activity
of interest but the growing knowledge that the child has concerning that activity.
This knowledge should be measurable by means other than just self-report, i.e.,
there should be some method of externalizing the flexibility with which the child
controls and governs his own behavioral repertoire.
Of course, various criteria become differentially important depending on the
particular goal of a research program. For example, for those interested in
training, the criteria of instructional relevance and a broad range of applicability
are paramount. But these criteria would not be so important for those concerned
with, for example, the earliest signs of strategic planning. We have included the
set of criteria here merely to illustrate some of the general concerns which should
be considered when embarking on a program of developmental research. The ones we
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have chosen are no doubt important but there are no doubt others we have over-
looked. In addition, we would not pretend that the tasks we have selected
successfully meet even our own criteria. Rather, we have introduced a few
idiosyncratic candidates which we favor and which we believe have the potential
of eventually satisfying a subset of the criteria.
B. Selected Tasks and Strategies
1. Extracting the main idea. Getting the gist of a message, whether oral
or written, is an essential communicative as well as information-gathering
activity. Without this ability, children would never learn a language and would
certainly never come to use that language as a vehicle for communication. The
ability to extract the main idea, to the exclusion of nonessential detail, may
be a naturally-occurring proclivity, given of course a reasonable match between
the complexity of the message and the receiver's current cognitive status
(Brown, 1975a).
In a recent series of studies (Brown & Smiley, 1977a, 1977b), we have been
considering the limited case where children must extract the main theme of a
prose passage, a story. Our subject population has ranged from preschoolers as
young as three years of age to college students, and the stories are adapted to
suit the different age groups. We find the same pattern across age: with or
without conscious intent to do so, subjects extract the main theme of a story
and ignore trivia. Even the youngest child's recall favors the essential action
sequences of the story. Preschool children provide less detailed recall of stories
or events, but they do favor the main theme. Older children have more highly-
developed scripts (Nelson, 1977; Nelson & Brown, 1977) for storytelling, but
even very young children apprehend the essential gist of a story plot (Brown, 1976).
Children are misled in their comprehension of stories by the same snares
that trap adults (Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend & Lawton, 1977). Led to believe
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certain "facts" concerning a main character or the location of an action, facts
which never appear in the original story, children disambiguate and elaborate in
the same way as adults. They false recognize theme-congruent distractors in
recognition tests, and introduce importations from their preexisting knowledge
when recalling. In addition, they have difficulty distinguishing between their
own elaborations and the actual story content.
If there is such essential similarity across ages in how children construct
a message from prose passages, what then is the interesting developmental trend?
Not surprisingly, given the theme of this chapter, we believe that what develops
is increasing conscious control of the naturally-occurring tendency, a control
which allows more efficient gathering of information.
As children mature they become able to predict in advance what are the
essential organizing features and crucial elements of texts (Brown & Smiley,
1977a, 1977b). Thanks to this foreknowledge, they make better use of extended
study time. If given an extra period for study (equal to three times their
reading rate), children from seventh grade up improve their recall considerably
for important elements of text; recall of less important details does not improve.
Children below seventh grade do not usually show such effective use of additional
study time; their recall improves, if at all, evenly across all levels of impor-
tance. As a result, older students' recall protocols following study include
all the essential elements and little trivia. Younger children's recall, though
still favoring important elements, has many such elements missing.
We believe that older students benefit from increased study time as a direct
result of their metacognitive insights and their ability to predict ahead of time
what are the important elements. Younger students, not so prescient, cannot be
expected to distribute extra time intelligently; they do not concentrate on only
the important elements of text, since they do not know in advance what they are.
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To substantiate our belief that metacognitive control governs this develop-
mental trend we have observed the study actions of our subjects. In particular,
we have examined the physical records they provide, records that can be scored
objectively--notes and underlining of texts. A certain proportion of children
from fifth grade and up spontaneously underline or take notes during study. At
all ages, the physical records of spontaneous subjects favored the important
elements; i.e., the notes or underlined sections concentrated on elements of the
text previously rated as crucial to the theme.
Students induced to adopt one of these strategies did not show a similar
sensitivity to importance; they took notes or underlined more randomly. Some of
the very young children underlined all the text when told to underline. Although
the efficiency of physical record keeping in induced subjects did improve with
age, it never reached the standard set by spontaneous users of the strategy.
Furthermore the recall scores of spontaneous producers were much superior. Even
fifth graders who spontaneously underlined showed an adult-like pattern and used
extra study to differentially improve their recall of important elements. When
we combined all fifth graders, the few spontaneous producers and the rest, the
efficient pattern of the spontaneous children was masked.
It should be pointed out that we do not believe there is a magical age at
which children become able to indicate the important elements of a text. This
is obviously a case of headfitting (Brown, 1975a, 1978), i*e., the intimate
relation of the child's current knowledge and the complexity of the stimulus
materials. We have found that with much simpler texts children can pick out the
main ideas at a much earlier age. We are currently examining whether they show
a concomitant decrease in the age of onset of simple strategies given this
foresight.
In short, knowledge about texts (or any message source for that matter) must
consist of general knowledge about consistent features of all texts and specific
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knowledge about the particular exemplar at hand, a specific knowledge which must
be influenced by the idiosyncratic characteristics such as complexity. Similarly,
we would expect that strategies for learning from text would depend on general
strategic knowledge about suitable activities but these would have to be
triggered by certain specific features of the text now being studied. Quite
simply, if the text is so complicated that the reader cannot identify the main
points, he can scarcely be expected to select them for extra study, even if he
possesses the prerequisite strategic knowledge that this would be a good study
ploy. Thus, we would predict that even the sophisticated college student may
behave immaturely when studying a difficult text.
This brief summary of some of our ongoing research (for details see Brown
& Smiley, 1977b), illustrates what we believe to be a repetitive pattern in cog-
nitive development. What develops is often increasing conscious control over an
early emerging process. Even young children extract the essential gist of messages
if they are not misled by red herrings, such as artificially increased salience
of nonessential detail (Brown, 1977b). All our subjects have shown this ability
to a lesser or greater extent--even preschool children (Brown, 1976), poor
readers (Smiley, Oakley,Worthen, Campione & Brown, 1977), and slow learners
(Brown & Campione, 1977b). What develops with age is strategies to assist this
process and enhanced sophistication and control over these strategies; a sophis-
tication embedded in increasing metacognitive insights. Using his knowledge about
elements of texts, his knowledge concerning how to study, and the interface of
these two factors, the older student can become much more efficient when processing
information presented in texts.
2. Visual scanning. Our next selection of a naturally-occurring ability
which shows interesting refinement and developing conscious control with age
and experience is the behavior of visual scanning, the process by which one
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"actively, selectively, and sequentially acquires information from the visual
environment" (Day, 1975). Effective and efficient visual scanning requires a
high degree of executive control,directing fixations and sequencing eye movements
from one point of the visual array to another.
The process of visual scanning begins in the first hours of life. Even
newborn infants scan visual stimuli (Salapatek, 1975), but in a very restricted
fashion: the young infant is likely to limit his fixations to only one corner
of a simple geometric figure (Salapatek, 1968), or to just one feature of a face
(Maurer & Salapatek, 1976). The young infant's attention is drawn, almost com-
pelled, to small areas of high contrast. He seems to have very limited voluntary
control over his looking and has been characterized as "captured" by visual
stimuli (Ames & Silfen, 1966; Stechler & Latz, 1966).
This involuntary looking gradually gives way during the first few months to
much more voluntary control. By three or four months a baby scans the entire
pattern, not just a single feature (Gibson, 1969), and thus becomes capable of
extracting more, higher-level information. In addition, active stimulus compari-
son is performed (Ruff, 1975): when presented with two visual patterns, a baby
looks back and forth between the two. The degree of shifting increases with age.
The more similar the stimuli, the more looking back and forth the infant does,
suggesting that even for infants the deployment of a strategy depends on the
difficulty of the task. Thus, in the first few months of life we can see impor-
tant refinements in visual scanning. The behavior comes more and more under
voluntary control and gains the infant an ever-increasing amount of information,
and rudimentary strategies for gathering information can be identified.
The later developmental course of visual scanning parallels the changes
occurring during infancy. Many aspects of development can be attributed to the
expanding role of internal, planful, self-regulation of scanning and the concomitant
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decreasing importance of external variables. Although the young infant gradually
stops being 'captured" by simple stimuli, we see repeated examples of this same
problem in older children attempting to cope with more complex tasks. The exact
manifestation varies according to the situation. For example, when studying an
unfamiliar irregular shape, three-year-old subjects make fewer eye movements than
six-year-olds (Zinchenko, Chzhi-tsin, & Tarakanov, 1963). Furthermore, the
younger children fixated primarily in the center of the figure, while the older
children's fixations cover its more informative contours.
Although six-year-olds in the Zinchenko et al. study showed relatively mature
scanning, if a more complex stimulus were presented, they might display immature
scanning. Mackworth and Bruner (1970) showed adults and six-year-old children
sharply focussed photographs with a great deal of detail information. The #ix-
year-olds often became "so hooked by the details" that they failed to scan broadly
over the rest of the stimulus: "Having arrived at a 'good place' on which to
rest their gaze, they seem to feel 'disinclined' to leap into the unknown areas
of the sharp pictures" (p. 165). Mackworth and Bruner concluded that adults
possess an effective visual search program, which enables them to coordinate
central and peripheral vision together, but that children do not. Children can
extract detail information centrally, and they can detect peripheral stimuli.
However, they cannot execute the two operations simultaneously. Thus, the main
problem is one of coordination and control, not the presence or absence of specific
skills.
Increased cognitive control is also reflected in other important developmental
changes in visual scanning. For example, children's scanning gradually becomes
more systematic, indicating the presence of higher-order organization of the
behavior. Vurpillot (1968) filmed the eye movements of four- to nine-year-old
children as they decided if two houses were identical. Unlike the older subjects,
the youngest children rarely made the systematic paired comparisons of comparably
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located windows that are necessary for successful performance. Furthermore, the
young children's scanning was less exhaustive. When two identical houses were
shown, they often failed to look at all the windows before pronouncing the
houses the same.
Another important developmental change in visual scanning is that with age
children focus on the more informative areas of a visual stimulus. The older the
child, the more likely he is to fixate those distinctive features that give him
the greatest amount of relevant information for the task at hand (Mackworth &
Bruner, 1970; Olson, 1970; Zinchenko et al., 1963). Conversely, young children
find it more difficult to ignore irrelevant information. Just as in incidental
memory studies and in prose studying experiments, the younger the child the more
attention he is likely to devote to stimuli that are irrelevant to the task he
is performing (Pushkina, 1971).
Although we have mentioned several general developmental trends in visual
scanning, it is extremely important to recognize that scanning behavior at any
age will vary greatly depending on the nature of the task and situation. Our
estimate of children's capabilities will always, necessarily, be a function of the
task we use to make the estimate, and we will probably err any time we characterize
the child as being either strategic or not strategic at a given age, as being
deficient at one point and productive at another. For example, consider the
question of whether preschool children can employ a strategy of scanning
systematically. The answer will depend very much on the stimulus presented. A
child might scan quite systematically around a group of fi!gures arranged in a
circle, in which case, as Day (1975) notes, the strategy is essentially "given"
by the stimulus. However, the same child might scan randomly the same number of
figures in a more complex arrangement. Thus, it will be crucially important to
what extent the child must generate and impose his own strategy on a visual array.
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Similarly, the degree of difficulty children have attending to informative
and ignoring irrelevant aspects depends on the stimuli. The clearer the stimuli,
the more likely children are to locate informative areas. The less organized the
stimulus and the greater the number of distracting elements it contains, the
harder it will be for the child to ignore those irrelevant elements. Although
by adulthood scanning has usually developed into quite an efficient, individu-
alized process (Noton & Stark, 1971), adults are by no means immune to the meta-
cognitive problems children experience so frequently. If required to perform a
difficult scanning task, such as inspecting chest x-rays for signs of pathology
(Thomas, 1968), adults (relative novices) often suffer some of the same defici-
encies seen in children, e.g., failing to scan as exhaustively as necessary or
failing to focus on the most informative areas.
Scanning tasks thus reveal the same general pattern illustrated by the gist
recall procedure. Scanning a visual array, like extracting the main idea, is a
naturally-occurring response necessary for a wide variety of tasks, and for sur-
vival. As the child matures he develops the ability to control and coordinate
scanning, to make scanning a strategic action tailored finely to changing task
demands.
3. Retrieval processes. For our third example we have selected retrieval,
considered broadly to encompass finding objects hidden in the external environ-
ment as well as retrieving information temporarily lost in memory. In both cases
the subject often must use some other information to help him track down the
desired object or thought. Although children can use external cues to search
the environment before they use internal cues to search their own memories, many
of the same strategies are relevant to both activities. Furthermore, in both
these activities an important aspect of what develops is that the child is
increasingly able to direct and control his search procedures, i.e., he achieves
increasing metacognitive control, including planning ahead to facilitate later
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retrieval and executing a search according to a logical plan. Our discussion
here will draw heavily on the work of John Flavell and his colleagues, for they
have been by far the most active and creative investigators in this area.
Retrieval activities occur naturally at an early age and continue to develop
over a long period of time. Even infants are capable of organizing a sequence of
behaviors into a search, but their initial efforts are very limited. The earliest
information we have concerning the development of retrieval comes from object
permanence tasks. When six- or seven-month-old infants first start searching for
hidden objects, they often do something very interesting from the point of view
of self-regulation. A child may initiate what appears to be an attempt to remove
the cloth concealing a desired object, only to become distracted by the cloth
itself. We can characterize this as a failure to maintain executive control: in
the midst of conducting a search, the child appears to forget the goal of the
search, and subsequently ceases those behaviors originally directed toward
achieving the goal. A minimal requirement for the coordination and control of
retrieval efforts is the ability to keep the goal in mind for a sufficient period
of time and in the face of distractions.
Another interesting aspect of early retrieval activities is that even
toddlers employ rudimentary strategies in their search efforts, as revealed by
the perseverative search errors they make in object permanence tasks (the Stage
IV error). Beginning at about eight months, an infant who has previously found
an object hidden at one place (A) is likely to search for it again at A, even
though he has just witnessed the object being hidden at a second location (B).
We would say, with Harris (1973), that the infant seems to be employing a stra-
tegy of looking for an object in the place where he found it before. Although
this strategy has obvious limitations and often causes the infant to fail in
object permanence tasks, it seems reasonable that looking for an object where
37
he found it before would serve the child relatively well in his everyday inter-
actions with objects. Interestingly, children as old as two have been found to
rely on this same strategy (Loughlin & Daehler, 1973; Webb, Masur, & Nadolny,
1972),
We have characterized the toddler's search as strategic, because it suggests
the systematic execution of a plan. The degree of self-conscious participation
involved, however, is probably minimal. As with the other areas we have reviewed,
children achieve increasing sophistication at retrieval processes as conscious,
voluntary control over them intensifies. In the case of retrieval, this sophis-
tication is clearly reflected in at least two characteristics of performance:
children become more likely to do something deliberate at the time of storage to
facilitate later retrieval, and their attempts at retrieval become more systematic
and efficient.
Even very young children engage in relatively simple behaviors whose sole
function is to help them remember where something is for later retrieval. Chil-
dren as young as three years old who have been instructed that they will later
have to recall the location of an object (Wellman, Ritter, & Flavell, 1975), or
an event (Acredolo, Pick, & Olsen, 1975), show better memory than children not
informed about a subsequent recall test. Thus, the children must do something to
help them remember during the delay. Wellman et al. (1975) observed their sub-
jects and reported that while they waited, the children in the instructed memory
condition looked at and touched the location they were supposed to remember.
Preschool children are also able to use a specific cue provided for them; when an
external cue marking the location of an object is made available, they can use it
to help retrieve the object (Ritter, Kaprove, Fitch, & Flavell, 1973). In
addition, they are sometimes capable of arranging a cue themselves to aid their
later retrieval (Ryan, Hegion, & Flavell, 1970).
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Not surprisingly, the tendency to use such cues increments with age. However,
even when they think to use a retrieval cue, younger children may fail to use it
as effectively as an older child. In a study by Kobasigawa (1974) first grade
children who spontaneously used an available category cue still recalled fewer
items per category than did third graders. In other words, even when they
thought to use the retrieval cues, the younger children failed to conduct an
exhaustive search for the items associated with each cue. Istomina (1975) also
noted the tendency of younger children not to execute an exhaustive search of
their memories. Although some of her four- and five-year-old subjects actively
attempted to recall a list of items, they still did not try to retrieve items not
immediately recalled. Older children, however, often showed signs of conducting
an active internal search: "In some cases the child recalled what he had forgotten
only with long pauses, during which he would try not to look at those around him,
i.e., he would direct his gaze downward, to the side, or screw up his eyes" (p. 31).
The non-exhaustive search of the younger subject could result from several possible
factors. The child may not check his output against a criterion of acceptability,
or, alternatively, he may have a different criterion from the experimenter's
(Kobasigawa, 1974). Or his monitoring of his own memory may be inadequate to
inform him that there are items yet to be recalled. In any case, these all
represent problems of metacognition of one sort or another. The essential simi-
larity of the problem of non-exhaustiveness in both visual scanning and retrieval
is obvious.
We have argued that there are some essential similarities between the
retrieval of objects from the environment and the retrieval of information from
memory and that many of the same strategies will be relevant in both cases, e.g.,
conducting an exhuastive search. However, it is clear that external retrieval is
an easier task than is memory scanning. Object retrieval studies show evidence
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of intentional efforts to remember and the use of strategies in children as young
as three, which is a much younger age than Istomina (1975) found that children
could deliberately adopt the goal of remembering and recalling a list of words.
In object retrieval situations the cues available to aid memory are external and
physically present; all the child must do is think to use them or orient to them.
Thus, the problem is much simpler than one in which the child must initiate and
maintain a purely internal, cognitive orientation to information in memory. The
latter requires a greater degree of metacognitive control: the child must use
internal processes, cognitions, to control other internal processes.
There is again some similarity between another crucial variable in visual
scanning, retrieval, and story recall. When structure is provided by the external
environment, a young child will perform much better than when he must provide that
structure for himself (Day, 1975). In story recall a similar dependence on
structure has been reported by Mandler and DeForest (1977). Young children are
even more dependent than their elders on the fact that the structure of stories
conforms to an idealized schema. Disturb this familiar structure and the young
child is lost but the older learner can use strategies to recover to some extent
from the violation of the normal story structure.
Another interesting aspect of the development of retrieval processes concerns
the growing knowledge children have about this process. Although young children
can use an external cue provided for them to set up such a cue themselves, they
have at best very limited knowledge about why such cues are useful or what types
of cues would be most effective (Gordon & Flavell, in press; Kreutzer, Leonard,
& Flavell, 1975). Such metamnemonic knowledge, which permits intelligent direc-
tion of memory activities develops gradually. For example, not until the age of
seven or eight do most children understand that the search for a lost object
should be limited to the area in which the object could logically be, i.e., the
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area between where one first discovers its absence and where one last remembers
having it (Drozdal & Flavell, 1975). Nine to 14-year-old children realize one of
the points we have emphasized in this section, that an external retrieval task,
finding a jacket lost at school, would be easier than a purely internal one,
remembering a great idea one had for a birthday present but then forgot (Yussen
& Levy, 1977). Better informed about retrieval processes in general, the older
child can become more flexible in generating strategies appropriate to the solution
of a given problem.
Our three selected tasks, extracting the gist, visual scanning and retrieval,
cannot be claimed to satisfy all the criteria set out at the beginning of this
section, but they approach this goal. The processes examined clearly are impor-
tant cognitive activities, relevant to a broad range of tasks. And they develop
over a wide age range, during which starting, intermediate, and end states can be
identified, and reidentified at several developmental stages depending on the
difficulty of the task and the match between the task demands and the child's
extant cognitive status. We know that extracting the gist and retrieval have
reasonable instructional relevance; this has already been demonstrated and,
indeed, is obvious. Visual scanning has received little attention from the
perspective of relevance for instructive purposes, although training in scanning
strategies has been found to modify the behavior of impulsive children who tend
not to focus on the more important areas of a stimulus (Egeland, 1974). Finally,
the knowledge that children possess has been shown to augment with experiences
in the domains of retrieval and getting the gist; both self-reports and observed
behaviors confirm the notion of increasing self-regulation. Although scanning
also shows increasing self-regulation, we know of no investigations aimed at the
child's conscious knowledge of his own visual scanning behavior. This would be
an interesting area of inquiry, although we hope it will not be dubbed meta-scanning.
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The main criterion left unsatisfied by all our tasks is that none of the processes
have been described by detailed, explicit developmental models of the type formu-
lated by Klahr & Siegler (in press). This unfortunately does not distinguish
them from most other processes under investigation by developmental psychologists,
and suggests what our future goals should be. The possibility of formulating
such models, we believe, depends on first selecting a task meeting at least the
criteria of development over a broad age range with identifiable states.
In summary, we believe that one main aspect of what develops is metacognition
--the voluntary control an individual has over his own cognitive processes. This
is certainly not to say that metacognition is the only thing that develops;
however, we have tried to illustrate our belief that the growth of metacognitive
abilities underlies many of the behavioral changes that take place with develop-
ment. When we examine a naturally occurring behavior, a behavior which begins
very early in the child's life without tutelage, what develops is often not so
much the process itself, but increasing sophistication and refinement in its
exercise. We have seen various aspects of this gradual refinement in all three
processes examined. Children become increasingly efficient at extracting infor-
mation, whether from a story, a picture, or their own memories. They come to rely
less on externally provided structure for they become able to generate their own
structure internally. This efficiency seems in part traceable to the development
of more efficient and effective strategies to help organize the extraction process
and a growing tendency to monitor them. These strategies include making more
exhaustive attempts, whether at recalling or scanning; the spontaneous adoption
of skills, such as note-taking and underlining texts or using a cue for retrieval;
and greater reliance on internal versus external control, whether scanning a
picture, comprehending a story, or retrieving ideas. By examining a variety of
apparently unrelated processes which develop over a wide age range, these
commonalities in what develops become quite striking.
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C. Methods for Observing Developmental Change
As our last general point, we would like to emphasize that in order to con-
struct a realistic picture of the child's competencies, it is sometimes necessary
to use methods other than traditional experimentation. We sometimes gain our
most interesting information from informally observing, questioning, and playing
with children, particularly the very young. Indeed, without these methods we
would have even less information about cognitive development below five than we
now do. We do not wish to denigrate experimentation. In fact, it is our bias
that in order to confirm a hypothesized developmental trend, it is almost always
necessary to devise a tightly-controlled experimental test. But we plead for
other approaches because of the predominance of laboratory experimental methods
in our field.
Although we realize that calls for an increased concern with the ecological
validity of our research enterprises are becoming commonplace, and to some
wearisome, we would support the movement in the area of the development of cognitive
skills. For it is true that our estimate of a child's competencies are some-
times dramatically changed if we consider his behavior in naturally-occurring
situations. If, therefore, we are in the business of delineating the cognitive
competencies of the four-year-old, we will gain a distorted picture if we only
see the four-year-old in a laboratory setting. Of course, the four-year-old's
laboratory performance is informative but it is only one side of the picture,
and it is the side we tend to concentrate on. To fill in the picture we need to
consider the other side, how our four-year-old functions in the world around
him, outside the confines of the laboratory. This argument probably holds for
any population including the rat, but gains more credence the younger and less
compliant the laboratory game player.
For these reasons we would like to advocate a three-prong research plan
similar to that described by Cole and Scribner (1975) for cross-cultural
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research comparisons. The basic theme is an interweaving of experimental and
ethnographic research to investigate a particular activity in a range of situa-
tions, from the naturally occurring to the experimental. Such a strategy seems
ideally suited for comparative research with groups that differ not in terms of
national origin or degree of formal schooling, but in terms of age or school
success within our society.
First, one should investigate the subject's understanding of the experiment
or task and his role as subject. Before reaching any conclusions concerning com-
petency one should become thoroughly familiar with the task demands and how these
appear to the child as well as the experimenter. We must know whether the child
is familiar with the materials and the response demands, whether he can under-
stand the instructions, and whether the point of the experiment seems reasonable
to him, In short, is the leading activity (Meacham, 1977) envisaged by the
experimenter (e.g., deliberate retention as goal) also countenanced by the child?
As a second approach, Cole and Scribner (1975) suggest that we should "experiment
with the experiment." Instead of repeating one fixed paradigm across ages, we
should work with many different variations of a paradigm, variations suited to
the interests and abilities of the children studied. The third strategy is to
investigate the same process in a range of situations, including the naturally-
occurring context of the culture, e.g., early childhood.
Cole and Scribner's plea is similar to that made by Soviet developmental
psychologists (Brown, 1978; Meacham, 1977). They emphasize that cognitive
activities develop and change within a socio-historical cultural context and the
nature of these acculturation processes influence the activities, motives, focus,
and types of cognitive competence displayed by the individual. Therefore, it
must be profitable to view the memory abilities of the developing child in
relation to the ecology of childhood.
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We know of few studies that exemplify this approach; in fact, to illustrate
it we will turn to some research conducted "long ago and far away." Almost
thirty years ago Istomina (1975) published a study in the Soviet Union on the
development of voluntary memory in children between three and seven years. We
would like to describe this experiment in some detail, because it provides such
an excellent example of our argument that assessment of children's memory capacity
and metacognitive skills is influenced by the artificiality of many laboratory
tasks, which the child may not fully understand or be fully engaged in.
One of the most interesting features of Istomina's experiment was a comparison
between children's memory for lists of words in a relatively standard list-learning
situation versus their memory for comparable lists embedded in a meaningful (to
the child) activity. Istomina's reasoning for contrasting these two conditions
was "that the development of retention and recall as internal, purposeful acts
takes place initially as part of a broader, articulated, and meaningful activity
(since it is only within the context of such activity that the specific acts of
remembering and recall can have any meaning for a child)" (pp. 8-9). A game that
made sense to the child and aroused a desire to participate should provide moti-
vation for the child to set memory goals for himself and to discover various
mnemonic means for remembering. The child should be more likely to adopt the goal
of remembering and to seek strategies to help him remember if he is highly
motivated to perform some task in which memory plays an essential role.
Istomina set children the task of remembering a list of items to be bought
at a play store. The store was set up in their preschool and equipped with a cash
register, scale, play money, and a variety of items "for sale," including toys,
food, clothing, etc. One at a time, the children were recruited to go on a
shopping errand. The teacher would slowly name five items for the child to buy
and send him to the store in the next room. An assistant at the store recorded
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how many items the child recalled and observed the accompanying activity.
The children were also tested for memory of comparable lists of words
presented in a traditional learning situation. The experimenter called each child
for a "lesson", and instructed the child to listen attentively so he could later
recall all the words. The list of words was of comparable length, meaning, and
difficulty to the list of store items. In both the game and learning situations,
the experimenter prompted the child to remember as much as he could, asking if he
could remember any more if he had forgotten anything.
Recall was clearly superior in the game situation, indeed almost twice as
high at the younger ages. When remembering is an intrinsic part of some meaningful
activity, we obtain a higher estimate of young children's memory capabilities
(Murphy & Brown, 1975).
We do not know exactly why recall is higher in a meaningful activity, but
Istomina suggests several possibilities. For one thing, the children are more
motivated to remember: they want to play the game properly, and at some point
most of the older children realize that this means they must remember their
shopping lists. Istomina argues that although the youngest children know what
it means to remember, this is not enough: "they must not only know what
remembering is by itself, but also be able to see it as an end result, an objective
to which activity must be directed, i.e., to grasp it as a goal" (Istomina, 1975,
p. 59). The goal of remembering is more salient in the game situation and
children are more likely to adopt it as their own goal in that task. This is
in contrast to the typical learning situation in which, however clear it seems
to the experimenter that the goal is to remember, w'e are often uncertain that the
child shares that goal.
Once the child can set remembering as a conscious goal for himself, he then
starts searching for more effective ways to carry it out. Istomina's naturalistic
situation produced a delightful set of protocols detailing individual children's
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emergent procedures for remembering. Many of her subjects seem to have dis-
covered spontaneously most of the mnemonic strategies developmental psychologists
have identified. The strategies adopted and the way in which they are used
become inpreasingly complex and sophisticated with age.
Three-year-old Valerik barely waited for the list of items to be read before
rushing off to the store. The three-year-old's view of the game seems to be
limited to assuming the role of going to the store and returning with items,
but does not seem to include the notion of bringing back the specific items on
the list. Four-year-old Igor listened attentively to the shopping list, and
then tried to carry out his errand as quickly as possible. He even seemed to
try to avoid distraction, refusing to stop and talk when on his way to the store.
Very few four-year-olds showed more specific mnemonic behaviors, but between
four and five a qualitative shift seemed to occur, and all the older subjects
seemed to make active attempts to remember. Many five-and six-year-olds
actively rehearsed: they were often observed moving their lips, repeating the
words over to themselves as the experimenter read them and as they walked to the
store.
Many of the older children showed strong evidence of executive control, and
seemed to be monitoring their own memory states and even checking themselves to
determine how well they remember:
Slava M. (five years, six months) listened silently as the list
was read, looking at the experimenter tensely, and after a slight pause
asked him to repeat the list one more time. He did not recall the list
immediately, frowning, shrugging his shoulders, and saying: "Wait a
minute, I'll get it, hold on . . ." (p. 26).
Dima F. (six years, six months) listened to the list, muttering
silently, and then repeated it almost as if to himself. At the store,
he quickly recalled three items, then paused, screwed up his eyes, and
said, with concern: "Oh! What alse was there? Nope, I can't remember
what else I have to buy . . ." (p. 26).
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"Alik K. (five years, eight months) listened to the message to the end and then
quickly went off to the store. However, halfway there he turned back. 'I can
only remember endive. What else was there?' he asked the experimenter" (p. 27).
Alochka also returned from the store to ask the experimenter for the items she
had forgotten. Clearly, these children must have been testing themselves on their
way to the store. Finally, the oldest children (six-seven years old) displayed
more sophisticated strategies of trying to form logical connections between the
items on their lists, often rearranging the order of the words based on their
meaning.
Istomina's (1975) work is fascinat.ing not just for the information it provides
about young children's memory processes, but also fre the methodological point it
emphasizes. The best situation in which to study very early memory development is
in a natural context in which the child is likely to understand the task and be
motivated to perform it. The young child's performance on laboratory tasks is
often markedly inferior to his performance in a game setting. Although this
variable is crucially important when studying very young children, the same general
point is applicable to other ages as well. Subjects of any age, even adults, are
likely to perform better in a meaningful task in which they are actively engaged.
Thus, if we want accurate, generalizable information about development, we should
extend the realm of our investigations from the laboratory into the real world.
However, a vital aspect of this approach is that we must investigate the same
process in both these situations; we must look at the process in a natural activity
that is meaningful to the subject and suited to his abilities, and we must also
use well-controlled experiments to test particular hypotheses about the process.
Experiments themselves can be engineered to provide controlled observations, and
exciting activities for children.
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V. Summary
The first section of this chapter was devoted to a consideration of tradi-
tional memory studies which have provided us with much of our information concerning
what develops. Major strengths and weaknesses of memory development studies were
illustrated by means of a comparison with recent research into children's problem-
solving skills. In the second part we concentrated on alternate methods and
procedures for attacking the problem of important developments in the ability to
think, reason,and solve problems.
A common theme throughout was the gradual emergence of finely tailored
skills adapted to meet specialized task demands. We attributed the heightened
sensitivity to fine gradations of the task and strategy interface to enhanced
metacognitive insights, i.e., the thinker's knowledge, control, and coordination
of his own cognitions. This accumulation of knowledge about how to think in an
increasing array of problem situations is an outcome of experience with more and
more complex problems. Young children's insensitivity to their problem-solving
potential is the result of lack of exposure to such situations, rather than age
per se, for the same problems that beset the very small problem solver can often
impede effective thinking in the adult novice.
To illustrate the emergence of increasingly strategic action we concentrated
on three main tasks: extracting the gist of a message, scanning the visual
environment, and retrieving lost information from the external world or from the
mind. These three tasks share several interesting similarities in development.
A considerati6n of cognitive growth in these domains, from infancy to maturity,
provided the principal support for our conceptualization of what develops. Our
candidate for a primary developmental agent is an expanding knowledge concerning
how to think and the ability to monitor and coordinate the activities displayed
in effective thinking.
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As a final point, we have concentrated in this chapter on "what develops"
in keeping with the title of the volume. However, we would like to point out
that an equally important question is how development occurs (Brown, 1978). It
seems to be fairly representative of the developmental literature that considerable
progress has been made in mapping what develops but there has been far less
attention paid to what mechanisms underlie this progression. The problems of
growth and change are quintessential developmental questions and are of fundamental
importance no less to the instructional psychologist who wishes to accelerate
growth, than to the theorists who seek to understand development. Therefore, in
conjunction with descriptions of the steps along the route from naivety to
expertise, we would like to see extended discussion of the conditions fostering
this growth in competence.
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